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Abstract 
 
Worldwide, maritime trade accounts for approximately 80% of all trade by 
volume and is expected to double in the next twenty years.  Prior to September 11, 2001, 
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) was afforded only 1 percent of United 
States Coast Guard (USCG) resources.   Today, it accounts for nearly 22 percent of 
dedicated USCG resources.  Tactical assessment of resource requirements and 
operational limitations on the PWCS mission is necessary for more effective management 
of USCG assets to meet the broader range of competing missions.  This research effort 
involves the development and validation of a discrete-event simulation model of the at-
sea vessel interdiction process utilizing USCG assets.   Through a simulation 
optimization approach, our research uses the efficiency of a localized search algorithm 
interfaced with the simulation model to assess resource allocation levels of USCG assets 
in the interception, boarding and control, and inspection processes that compose the 
overall interdiction process with the overall objective of minimizing process time 
requirements. 
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ANALYZING THE INTERDICTION OF SEA-BORNE THREATS  
USING SIMULATION OPTIMIZATION 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated the length to which terrorists 
would go to harm Americans and the economy of the United States.  A number of those 
involved in the 9/11 plot lived among us as our neighbors and trained to harm us on our 
very own soil. The idea that an enemy would use the infrastructure of the US against its 
people is not a new strategy in warfare, but one with unsettling consequences for a 
country that has traditionally been a land of immigrants.  Based on 9/11, it is easy to 
believe that future attacks will also come from within the US.  Five years later, their 
actions have resulted in a deep, inward look at what US national security really means 
and how the use of unconventional means of warfare can be prevented.  This thesis 
focuses on a concept of operations in development by the United States Coast Guard to 
address the vulnerability of US ports and waterways to people, cargoes, and/or vessels 
with the intent to harm. 
1.1.1 Emerging Concern 
“Over 90 percent of the nation’s $5.3 billion annual investment in the TSA goes 
to aviation—to fight the last war.…  While commercial aviation remains a 
possible target, terrorists may turn their attention to other modes. Opportunities to 
do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime or surface transportation. Initiatives 
to secure shipping containers have just begun. Surface transportation systems 
such as railroads and mass transit remain hard to protect because they are so 
accessible and extensive.” [1] 
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The passage above was taken from the final 9/11 Commission Report written in 
2002.  The take home message is US maritime security is necessary for national security.  
The true expansiveness of the problem can be understood with a few statistics.  Maritime 
trade accounts for approximately 80 percent of all world trade by volume.  Waterborne 
domestic commerce in 2004 accounted for 25 percent of the United State’s Gross 
Domestic Product [16].  The total volume of domestic and international trade is expected 
to double in the next twenty years according to the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
of 2002.  The economic collapse of the US maritime trade industry from a terrorist attack, 
a shutdown of trade due to a breach of security, or even a union strike (as evidenced by 
the dispute between the Pacific Maritime Association and the International 
Longshoremens and Wharehousemens Union in 2002) has serious implications to the US 
and world economies.  The impact of a weapon reaching a major city through a US port 
is even more daunting. 
Assessments from security analysts reveal the threat from terrorist attack is 
becoming increasingly likely at US ports where it is not unimaginable that a passenger, 
vessel, or the vessel’s cargo, can become the conduit for the next attack on American soil. 
Since these observations, major efforts have been made to reduce US vulnerability to acts 
of terrorism propagated by insufficient border and port security, but we are not there yet. 
The US shares nearly 7,500 miles of land border with Canada and Mexico, over 
12,000 miles of coast line along the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and more than 300 sea 
and river ports with over 3,700 cargo and passenger terminals.  While the focus on 
maritime activities is getting sharper, the ability to perform 100 percent screening of all 
vessels, cargoes, and persons that enter US waters remains infeasible, being limited by 
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resources available to perform screening, the structure of the global trade system which 
relies on a “just in time” strategy to reduce storage costs, and technological limitations on 
non-invasive screening capability intended to reduce the impact to the flow of commerce.  
Clearly, a middle ground is needed.  
1.1.2 Border Security Measures 
In response to US maritime vulnerabilities, programs and policies have been 
enacted, funding for the PWCS mission has increased, and technological and procedural 
changes have been implemented.   
Maritime Security Initiatives and Programs 
In the realm of programs and policies, the International Maritime Organization 
implemented a group of regulations known as the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) to 
improve safety at sea, standardize protection measures, facilitate trade among seafaring 
states, and protect the marine environment.  In December 2002, the Maritime Safety 
Committee (MSC 76) added the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
Code to SOLAS aimed at enhancing maritime security on board ships and at ship/port 
interface areas.  This group of regulations provides the foundation for procedural safety 
and security cooperation of peaceful countries with the United States.   
Two specific implementations aimed at protecting the US from dangerous cargoes 
are the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Smart Box Initiative.  Some would 
argue that containers pose the greatest threat to US national security because containers 
are difficult to screen, one container ship can hold thousands of them from multiple 
suppliers originating from various countries (making intelligence key to finding the 
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proverbial needle in the haystack), and as containers are offloaded, they can be stored for 
days on site or driven by trailer into an unsuspecting US city.   
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) promotes the development of bi-lateral 
agreements between the United States and foreign countries to pre-screen high-risk 
containers in origination ports.  Several hundred Customs and Border Protection officers 
have been placed at 42 major foreign seaports to pre-screen cargo containers before they 
are loaded onto vessels bound for the US. 
The Smart Box Initiative promotes the use of “tamper evident” containers to 
enhance security of containerized shipping.  A mechanical seal affixed to the container 
door along with an electronic container security device alerts inspectors to the attempted 
intrusion. 
Oversight programs such as Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), which includes 
membership of the Department of Homeland Security (Office of Domestic Preparedness, 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate, the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection and the US Coast Guard) and the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, 
and State, seek to identify vulnerabilities in container supply chain security.  
The CSI and Smart Box Initiatives and the OSC program have been shown to add 
value to the objective of national security, but do not lend support to the other types of 
cargo shipped globally every day.  The idea of cargo-tampering prior to delivery to the 
dock has been addressed on numerous occasions leading the US to develop such 
programs as the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT).  This program 
seeks to build a relationship between the US and the participant in the program allowing 
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enforcement of policies, plans, and procedures that maintain the integrity of their entire 
supply chain.   
More information about maritime regulation can be found at the following 
websites: International Maritime Organization (www.imo.org), Customs and Border 
Protection (www.cbp.gov), or through the Federal Maritime Commission 
(www.fmc.gov).   
While not all-encompassing as of yet, these programs and policies make up the 
first major stride to secure the US shipping industry and directly impact this study.  While 
the use of containers has conjured specific initiatives to enhance security, the 
vulnerability of other types of cargo, people such as vessel crew and passengers aboard 
cruise ships, as well as the vessel itself, have all become potential points of vulnerability.  
However, they are addressed via procedural implementations such as visual inspection 
until technological implementations can be enforced.   
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 
At the present time, the primary methods for detecting potential terrorist activity 
are through the use of radiological detectors, visual inspection, and intelligence. The 
ability to perform 100 percent screening of all cargoes, vessels and people entering the 
US is infeasible due to limitations on resources to perform the screening process, 
technology that allows for efficient screening, and the current structure of the global 
supply system which operates under a “just in time” policy set up to reduce storage time 
and cost.  
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Technological and Procedural Implementation 
At the present time, the primary methods for detecting potential terrorist activity 
are through the use of radiological detectors, visual inspection, and intelligence. The 
ability to perform 100 percent screening of all cargoes, vessels and people entering the 
US is infeasible due to limitations on resources to perform the screening process, 
technology that allows for efficient screening, and the current structure of the global 
supply system which operates under a “just in time” policy set up to reduce storage time 
and cost.  
Radiological detectors used by USCG personnel are typically handheld devices 
provided to each member of an inspection team or port screening personnel.  A 
procedural method of detection is the visual inspection of cargo either at the originating 
port or aboard the targeted vessel during the at-sea inspection.  Visual inspections require 
the ability to reach the cargo whether it is contained in a container or in a cargo hold.  If 
located in a container, cargo may be required to be unloaded from the container for 
inspection.  
Another procedural change to prior doctrine is the targeting of non-compliant 
vessels, cargoes, and people through review of intelligence reports and indications by 
Customs and Border Protection personnel located at the originating port.  By targeting 
potential threats before they enter US waters is a fairly new concept called “pushing out” 
the borders discussed in Section 1.1.3.    
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1.1.3 Layered Approach to Border and Transportation Security 
In “Border and Transportation Security: Possible New Directions and Policy 
Options,” [29] addresses the role of Border and Transportation Security in Homeland 
Defense.  Congressional concern increased following multiple attacks in the 1990s, and 
culminated after the attacks of 9/11 with several studies furnishing measures to protect 
the nation from future attacks. Congressional policy actions such as broadening efforts to 
understand the terrorist threat through the creation of the Gilmore Commission, the Hart-
Rudman Commission, and the Bremer Commission; the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act of 2001 focused on specific actions to counter an immediate threat; creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security to provide an organizational framework for 
subsequent efforts; procedurally, the USA PATRIOT Act  was implemented to provide 
tools for addressing the new emerging threats. Congressional concern went from broad to 
specific and back to broad when it became evident that the effort to meet the challenge 
was not aggressive enough.  The requirement of a more strategic approach through 
integrated terrorist watch-lists and measures to address other forms of transit, were 
highlighted in the final 9/11 Commission report, which stressed the need for port 
security.  
The authors presented a “layered” approach defining points of vulnerability in 
homeland security as transportation staff, passengers, conveyances, access control, cargo 
and baggage, ports, and security en route. A visual depiction of this concept, according to 
W. Robinson et al., is a series of concentric screens, with the outermost screen 
representing the efforts of prevention overseas; the middle screen focuses on protection 
of the homeland through interdiction efforts at the borders and in the transportation 
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system; the most inner screen represents emergency response and preparedness.  The 
bottom line is failure of any one layer would not be fatal.   
The concept of “pushing out” U.S. borders is hard to attribute to one specific 
author, but has become the dominant conceptual solution to handling the threat of 
terrorism.  Multiple and overlapping layers (or measures) means more opportunity for 
interdiction of threats to U.S. national security.   
In discussions on this thesis project, the USCG elaborated on a similar strategy in 
development to address port security. The first line of defense is the efforts of Customs 
and Border Protection at foreign ports to screen cargo before it is loaded on a vessel 
bound for the United States.  The second line of defense is the targeting and interdiction 
of high risk vessels, identified through intelligence gathering efforts, before they reach 
US waters.  The third line of defense is screening efforts at US ports.   This thesis focuses 
on the middle layer representing the interdiction of threats to national security.  While 
information from CBP and ICE influence the targeting of high risk vessels either by 
cargo or crew, respectively, the interdiction and initial inspection efforts are performed 
by the USCG. 
1.2. Motivation 
The concept of “pushing out” United States borders is hard to attribute to one 
specific author, but has become the dominant conceptual solution to handling the threat 
of terrorism in the maritime domain.  “Pushing out the border” is a concept that defines a 
notional border created beyond the physical borders of the US at which layers of security 
measures are implemented.  Robinson et al. [29] introduce this concept of a layered 
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approach to border and transportation security with multiple and overlapping layers (or 
measures) to provide more opportunities for interdiction of threats to US national 
security.  Visually, the authors describe the overall homeland security effort as a series of 
concentric screens where the outermost screen represents preventative efforts outside our 
borders, i.e. inspections of goods at foreign ports; the middle screen represents 
interdiction efforts at the “border”, i.e. land borders and coastlines; and the most inner 
screen representing emergency preparedness and response, i.e. healthcare and clean up 
efforts after an attack. 
In discussions on this thesis project, the Prevention Liaison to the Deepwater 
Sponsor from the USCG described a similar strategy to address port security.  Figure 1-1 
depicts this layered approach to border and transportation security.  The first line of 
defense is the efforts of Customs and Border Protection at foreign ports to screen cargo 
before it is loaded on a vessel bound for the United States.  The second line of defense is 
the targeting and interdiction of high risk vessels, identified through intelligence 
gathering efforts, before they reach US waters.  The third line of defense is screening 
efforts at US ports.  While information from CBP and ICE influence the targeting of high 
risk vessels either by cargo or crew, respectively, the interdiction and initial inspection 
efforts are performed by the USCG.  This thesis focuses on the middle layer representing 
the interdiction of threats to national security.    
Acknowledging this layered concept and an expressed desire by the Prevention 
Liaison to the Deepwater Sponsor (G-RCD-1) of the USCG for a tactical-level 
assessment of measures of performance for deepwater assets in response to a sea-borne 
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threat, this thesis focuses on the middle layer representing the interdiction of targeted 
vessels en route to a US port.    
 
Emergency Preparedness 
and Response
Interdiction
Prevention
 
Figure 1-1:  Layered Approach to Border and Transportation Security 
1.3. Problem Statement 
The problem at hand is one of growing concern.  The use of US ports to transport 
a person or weapon intended to do harm within the United States is possible.  In the last 
five years, efforts to suppress this threat have taken front stage, but there is not one all 
encompassing solution.  This is a problem requiring a multi-pronged approach.  
Congressional oversight has pushed measures requiring 100 percent screening of all 
vessels, cargoes, and people at US ports.  At this point in time, this requirement is 
infeasible considering the resources necessary to perform the job.  The USCG is looking 
into one potential prong in the approach to risk reduction at US ports.  Specifically, they 
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have developed a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for performing more at-sea 
inspections.  Before implementing a CONOPS, they must review force structuring to 
determine the impact to other USCG mission areas.   
This thesis focuses on the investigation of deepwater efforts in the interdiction 
layer of defense described above as it relates to capability and availability of assets and 
execution of mission requirements in the performance of at-sea vessel interdiction, 
boarding and control of targeted vessel, and subsequent inspection.  
1.4. Research Objectives 
In this work, we develop a framework for analyzing a USCG concept of operations 
(CONOPS) using simulation optimization.  We describe the three processes involved in 
interdiction operations: interception, control and boarding, and inspection of a targeted 
vessel, through the use of a discrete-event simulation model.  We address resource 
utilization of USCG assets in typical day to day missions that would compete with the 
interdiction mission if the CONOPS were implemented.  This addition to the model 
provides a realistic account of expected resource availability across all USCG missions.   
Further, we interfaced the model with a metaheuristic in this simulation 
optimization approach to lay a foundation for future expansion of the USCG resource 
allocation problem.   
The impact of implementing the CONOPS is assessed using varying mission ops 
tempos for the interdiction model and the competing mission model. Specifically, we 
look at low, medium, and high asset usages for each model with the purpose of 
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determining the expected utilization of the assets under these conditions.  Three 
performance measures are evaluated in this study: 
1. Investigation of time requirements for interception, boarding and control, and 
inspection(s); 
2. Investigation of USCG asset utilization in the mission-constrained environment; 
3. Identification of potential USCG strategies for the at-sea interdiction mission 
based on 1 and 2 above. 
 The outcome of this thesis includes recommendations for force-structuring to 
implement the at-sea interception CONOPS based on current resource allocations.  
1.5. Organization 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter two provides a 
review of relevant maritime and USCG studies, a synopsis of maritime programs and 
policies, and background on the methodologies applied in this thesis.  Chapter three 
elaborates on the simulation model design and application of the heuristic to the 
neighborhood of solutions.  Chapter four provides the results of the study and statistical 
analysis when applicable.  Chapter five concludes with a discussion of the contributions 
of this research and potential follow-on studies. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
This chapter addresses previous maritime and port studies, studies specific to 
maritime security, and a discussion of the simulation optimization technique applied in 
this research.  Each subtopic represents a considerable body of work and there is 
insufficient space in this thesis to adequately summarize all related materials.  Thus, we 
have attempted to build an adequate understanding of the environment under study and 
highlight those works that directly relate to the problem being solved. 
2.1. Maritime and Port Studies 
Numerous maritime and port studies have been performed using simulation 
modeling.  Simulation has assisted in investment planning for Istanbul seaport and 
development of future berth requirements at a third-world port [36].  It has also aided in 
multiple container terminal studies.  Shabayek et al. investigated the prediction accuracy 
of a simulation of container terminal operations compared to Hong Kong’s port 
operations [32].  Ballis modeled straddle carriers in a container terminal to evaluate 
different configurations of the system [6].  Chung et al. looked to reduce total loading 
time of a transtainer-based container port with a buffer space [10].  
Intermodal transportation in the port environment has also been studied.  Parola et 
al. developed a discrete-event simulation modeling approach to evaluate future growth 
potential of two Italian ports in the Ligurian Sea using various scenarios of intermodal 
travel options [27].  Valetin et al. used Arena simulation software to model a large 
maritime infrastructure system at the port of Tanger in Morocco to evaluate the number 
of ships supportable by the port and the optimum infrastructure considering 
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environmental effects [40].  A study by Sharpe et al. who simulated the inspection 
process of cargo containers at US seaports, determined the configuration of inspection 
processes that achieve the largest number of inspected containers at the lowest cost [33].    
Most of the studies referenced above are concerned with simulation of port-
centric environments—port-side environments.  Simulations in the sea environment are 
difficult to find in the literature.  In 2005, van Rensburg et al. simulated container 
transport by container vessel [42].  However, specific literature that addresses security 
inspections at sea is not available.  This research addresses this deficiency through the 
study of the at-sea USCG interdiction process. 
2.2. United States Coast Guard Studies 
More related to this study are the works of Smith and Bailey et al.  Smith 
performed a study of demands on Coast Guard assets for search and rescue services with 
the ultimate objective of finding the near-optimal solution by comparing multiple 
simulation outputs at various resource levels [34].  Bailey et al. develop a methodology 
for determining the operational efficiency of cutter patrol schedules in response to 
prevention, disruption, and punishment of acts of smuggling. An objective function 
containing patrol, day, and cutter type variables, generates a dynamic program that 
describes the interaction between the cutter and smuggler with the overall objective of 
finding the smuggler strategy that maximizes the mean profit attained by the smuggler 
[5].  
The use of simulation to address large resource allocation problems is not a new 
concept to the Coast Guard.  The USCG has funded simulation projects such as the 
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search and rescue Simulation (SARSIM) in order to assess allocation of resources as the 
configuration of SAR requirements increases in complexity.   
More recently, the United States Coast Guard funded the MarOpsSim to develop 
a simulation of strategic homeland security operations under the Deepwater Maritime 
Operational Effectiveness Simulation (DMOES) program. This campaign-level model 
was built in 2003 to assist USCG leadership in large-scale, “system-of-system”, force 
planning.  While useful as a strategic predictor of force requirements, it lacks insight into 
specific mission requirements such as the PWCS mission.  The model presented in this 
study aims to provide this insight for the at-sea interdiction and inspection process 
employed by the USCG.  An important element to these processes is the implementation 
of maritime programs and policies created to enhance maritime safety and security. 
2.3. Simulation Optimization 
One of the most powerful aspects of simulation is that it allows the researcher to 
study a system that may not be available for study due to operational constraints, 
complexity, safety concerns, or because it does not yet exist. When a system is not in 
existence, a simulation model of the proposed system allows the researcher/user to collect 
data about the modeled system in order to understand how it is expected to work.  An 
example of this is the development of the Boeing 777 commercial aircraft.  The 777 was 
simulated by computer before any part was built—the design made robust before 
assembly began on the production line.  The Boeing Company was able to reduce costs 
and risks in production while increasing sales potential through computer-aided design.  
The 777 is arguably one of the best practical examples of simulation optimization, but it 
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is only one form of an expansive field of numerous applications termed “simulation 
optimization.” [7] 
Simulation optimization, the application of an optimization tool such as a 
metaheuristic with computer simulation, was born of the need to solve complex problems 
efficiently.  The merging of optimization with simulation offered a new methodology for 
addressing systems with nonlinearities, combinatorial relationships, and/or stochastic 
characteristics.  Simulation optimization has a wide range of applications, i.e. scheduling, 
resource allocation, assignment, transportation, routing, network design, graph theory, 
manufacturing, financial analysis, to name a few.  Wherever complexity and/or 
uncertainty are present, the flexibility of simulation optimization can greatly enhance 
problem solving capability.  In keeping with the military adage, “keep it simple,” choice 
of the heuristic is crucial to the characteristics of the search environment and heavily 
suited to the properties of that particular heuristic. 
 
 
Figure 2-1:  Interaction between Simulation and Optimization Components 
 
The optimization procedure is instrumental in the selection of the input values and 
uses the output to determine the next set of input values in an iterative process.  Figure 
2-1:  Interaction between Simulation and Optimization Components.  Figure 2-1 presents 
this interaction between the optimizer and the simulator [2]. 
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Heuristics were made popular in the mid-20th century by George Póyla who wrote 
the book “How to Solve it”—a different perspective on how to approach problems.  
Heuristics is considered a form of “cognitive strategy”, a departure from systematic 
problem solving using tractable mathematics to a more intuitive approach that provides a 
cheap, educated guess [22]. 
2.3.1 Tabu Search 
A specific metaheuristic developed by Glover in the late 1980s, tabu search, is a 
general iterative heuristic used for solving combinatorial optimization problems by 
invoking a local neighborhood search, then selecting the best solution in the 
neighborhood as the current new solution [18, 19, 20].  The use of a tabu list and the 
length of tenure of previously visited solutions to prevent cycling, in addition to 
aspiration criteria, which serves to bump the search to new neighborhoods within the 
solution space, provide the backbone to tabu search methodology.  When problems are 
complex, heuristics such as tabu search can make finding a near-optimal solution easier 
and can be adapted to search regions with multiple optima to find a set among many sets 
of model specifications that lead to a near-optimal solution efficiently. 
The true power of the tabu search algorithm lies in its flexible memory 
component which, depending on the length of the memory, can enhance the quality and 
performance of the heuristic.  There are three types of memory components: short-term, 
intermediate-term, or long-term.  The short term memory component provides tabu (or 
forbidden) conditions for the search and aspiration criteria while the medium and long 
term memories add intensification and diversification elements, respectively, to the 
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search.  During search intensification, the algorithm records and compares features of 
solutions found during the search.  Common features are then sought in new solutions in 
areas where good solutions had previously been found.  Diversification, on the other 
hand, seeks to explore new regions or neighborhoods, i.e. move from one local optima to 
the next, with the hope of eventually moving a global optimum.  With the use of 
aspiration criteria, a previously visited solution can be accepted if its meets specific 
criteria. A worse solution can replace a better solution if its attribute(s) are not tabu [30].   
Tabu search has had success in a number of areas including the study of military 
operations such as air tanker refueling [9,35] and crew scheduling [11], in-theater vehicle 
routing [13], unmanned aerial vehicle routing [26], weapons assignment [14], and combat 
aircraft scheduling [8] to highlight a few examples.    
The application of tabu search in simulation optimization has also been applied to 
a variety of problems—usually where complexity makes the problem nearly impossible 
to solve analytically.  An indication of the important role of tabu search in practical 
problem solving can be seen in a study of a sequencing problem by Yang et al. [45].  
While most researchers treat the flow-shop with multiple processors (FSMP) as a 
deterministic problem ignoring the stochastic nature of the real-world problem, Yang et 
al. modeled the nonlinearity and randomness of the FSMP environment, and then studied 
the system under varying conditions. 
One more example of the utility of tabu search is its application in large-scale 
value-at-risk (VAR) optimization of an electrical power system by Gan et al.  Using the 
flexibility, speed, and simplicity of a generalized tabu search algorithm, the authors 
adapted the search to address a nonlinear, mixed integer programming problem, known to 
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be NP-hard (nondeterministic polynomial time) with no available polynomial time 
algorithm.  As the flexibility of tabu search is further confirmed through studies such as 
these, it becomes clear tabu search in simulation optimization can be a powerful tool to 
solve difficult problems [17].  These brief examples show that tabu search can be applied 
in many areas. 
2.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter, a brief overview of works in port and maritime research was 
provided.  Studies of USCG systems were highlighted along with a concise discussion of 
the wide range of applications for simulation optimization, and specifically, the tabu 
search metaheuristic.  The literature review revealed that although many works exist in 
simulation optimization, and a few in USCG applications, the marrying of simulation 
optimization with a tabu search applied to a USCG problem is not well addressed, if at 
all.  
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3. Methodology 
 
Chapter two summarized applicable work in the field of maritime simulation, 
simulation optimization, and Coast Guard-specific operation modeling.  In this chapter, 
we build the simulation optimization methodology for this thesis through a discussion of 
the simulation model and the optimization technique.  In section 3.2, we review the 
problem at hand.  In section 3.3, building upon the model details, we first discuss the 
conceptual model of the interdiction process and competing mission model, and then in 
section 3.4, we provide a discussion of the specific aspects of the simulation optimization 
effort, finishing with a synopsis of the methodology employed. 
3.1. Overview 
Numerous border and transportation security studies have focused on the 
vulnerability of US ports to attack by terrorist groups either through border infiltration by 
members of a group or delivery of a weapon meant to collaterally or economically harm 
the United States.  Congressional bills have been passed to address and fund security 
screening initiatives at major US ports, but according to USCG officials and other 
sources, the ability to perform 100 percent screening at major US ports is infeasible under 
current technological and resource constraints considering the ramifications to the flow of 
commerce.  As the ultimate authority of port, waterway, and coastal security, the USCG 
is cultivating a different approach to the problem—using simulation to provide insight 
into changes to doctrine and application of resources in order to efficiently manage a 
problem that is becoming more real every day—how to handle potential threats as far 
from US shores as possible.  
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3.2. Problem Statement 
As discussed in chapter one, the problem we seek to address is how to minimize the 
amount of time required by USCG personnel and assets to perform an interdiction of a 
vessel that has been targeted through information sources as a potential risk to US 
security before it reaches a US port.  Applying principles of decision analysis, the 
problem can be decomposed into three distinct processes: 
1. Interception of targeted vessel 
2. Control and boarding of vessel 
3. Inspection of cargoes, vessel, and crew  
The interception of the threat involves receipt of targeting information from 
intelligence sources, knowledge of threat location, direction and speed of movement, and 
selection of assets to intercept the Target of Interest (TOI).  Interception may require one 
asset or combinations of assets to perform the mission.  We make the assumption that 
selection of the target has already been made from intelligence sources at the start of the 
simulation. 
Control and boarding is the process of subduing a non-compliant crew, 
accounting for all crew members, and checking for stowaways or immediate indications 
of intent to harm.  Control of a hostile situation where the crew is deemed non-compliant 
can be considered dependent on the size of the crew and their intentions.  Accounting for 
all crew members is directly related to the size of the crew and the propriety of the 
documentation presented. Checking for stowaways involves checking every crevice of 
the ship potentially inhabitable by a living organism. One aspect that can not be modeled 
with any accuracy is the ability to sense a dangerous situation or to sense harmful 
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intentions.  Therefore, a time delay has been modeled to account for this action on the 
part of USCG personnel. 
Inspection of cargo, vessel, and crew is a function of size and type of ship, size of 
crew, type of cargo, size and capability of the inspection team, and specificity of the 
threat.  The size and type of ship directly affect the ease with which the inspection team 
can perform its job. The more challenging the configuration of the ship (i.e. container 
ship), the more time required to inspect.  The size of the crew plays an important role in 
the review of intelligence documentation to determine the risk of ties to terrorist groups.  
The type of cargo may require greater scrutiny, such as a dry bulk carrier with tons of 
fertilizer on board or if a cargo manifest appears to have errors or the shipment was 
labeled as high risk by Customs and Border Protection.  The size and capability of the 
inspection team are directly related to the method of delivery to the TOI.  For instance, 
delivery via HH60 helicopter limits the size of the team to 6 persons.  Another limitation 
is the WMD detection capability of teams deployed with cutter assets because they do not 
have the same inspection capability as other teams in the USCG.  For these specific 
concerns, the team is treated as a random variable distributed triangular with a minimum 
of six, mode of eight, and maximum of ten, and only MSST or MSRT insertion is 
modeled.   This aspect of the problem deserves more consideration than it will be given 
here, but should be studied as a means of maximizing inspections by selecting assets by 
capability.  
Figure 3-1 represents a decomposition of our fundamental objective—to minimize 
the time required to interdict a targeted vessel—into three distinct mean objectives: 
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minimize time required to intercept vessel, board and control the vessel, and inspect the 
vessel, cargoes, and crew. 
“Minimize time required to intercept targeted vessel,” can be further decomposed 
into five measures of attainment of that objective: asset speed and location, threat 
location; sea conditions, and assets available to perform interception. 
“Minimize time required to board and control targeted vessel,” is measured by 
size of the targeted vessel, compliance of its crew to demands of USCG authorities, and 
targeted vessel crew size. 
“Minimize time to inspect targeted vessel,” can be measured through five 
attributes: size and type of targeted ship, size of the inspection team, targeted vessel crew 
size, and specificity of the intelligence.   
 
Minimize Time Required to 
Intercept Targeted Vessel
Minimize Time Required to 
Board and Control Targeted 
Vessel
Minimize Time Required to 
Inspect Targeted Vessel
Minimize Time for Interdiction Operation 
Selection of faster 
assets
Availability of 
assets
Location of assets 
Ship type
Crew size
Compliance with 
authorities
Ship sizeShip size
Crew size
Inspection team 
size
Sea Conditions
Location of 
targeted vessel Intelligence 
 
Figure 3-1:  Objectives Hierarchy for the USCG Interdiction Problem 
While most of these measures of the mean objectives are directly and naturally 
measurable, i.e. speed, availability, location of asset(s), crew size, and inspection team 
size, a scale would be required to describe ship size, ship type, intelligence, and 
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compliance.  Although ship size can be measured in TEUs, the time required to check 
different types of cargo at the same TEU can be variable in nature.  Because ships can be 
converted to hold different types of cargo, this also presents variability in how to address 
this aspect of the affected process times.  Here, we defined this idea of decomposing the 
processes into factors that contribute to the objective function value of the different 
processes.  However, due to the lack of data to legitimize the construction of these 
functions and guidance received from our USCG subject matter expert, we have chosen 
to mention them here and again in chapter five, but use a moderate approach to modeling 
the delays incurred by these processes. 
3.3. Conceptual Model 
The problem addressed in this research is to minimize the time required to 
intercept, board and control, and inspect sea-borne vessels that have been targeted as 
potential threats while they are in the deepwater environment (50 to 200 nautical miles).  
The path that will induce the largest amount of variability in the solution is the 
interception portion of the model.  The other two processes, boarding and control and 
inspection, are easily represented as a stochastic measure of time dependent on factors 
such as the size and type of vessel, and size and intent of crew.  The graphical 
representation of the interception process is presented in Error! Reference source not 
found. with each possible path identified as a one way arc.   
 
HH-60
Targeted Vessel
110’ WPB
378’ WHEC
Inspection Team
270’ WMEC
 
Figure 3-2:  Conceptual Interception Process 
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We treat the problem as a network flow which provides a framework for the 
structure of the heuristic later discussed.  Using integer programming, and assuming the 
objective function is linear in nature, the mathematical representation is  
 
minimize ∑ cx 
s.t. Ax = b 
xij = 0 or xij = 1 
 
In this model, the row vector c represents the cost on each arc.  In this case, the 
cost is the time required to traverse the arc; x represents the linear combination of arcs 
that compose a particular feasible solution of assets to perform the interdiction.  The cost 
on each arc (or path) is calculated based on distance between the targeted vessel and the 
intercepting asset(s) and asset speed using the standard two-dimensional Cartesian 
formula for distance. 
2 2
asset target asset targetDistance ( ) ( )x x y y= − + −  
 
Dividing the distance by the speed of the intercepting assets gives the time required to 
travel to the targeted vessel.  We treat the travel times as deterministic measures of time; 
however, a future upgrade to the model would be to incorporate a stochastic element to 
account for variations in travel times due to Sea Conditions.   
A problem such as this presents an excellent opportunity for simulation to handle 
the diversity of the environment as well as the ability to prove a concept of operations 
that can’t be proven with the real USCG assets due to budgetary and operational 
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limitations.  The following sections identify key aspects of the operational environment 
that will be represented in the simulation environment. 
3.4. Simulation Optimization 
In this effort, we represent the processes of interdiction, control and boarding, and 
inspection to an available level of abstraction to estimate the time spent performing these 
processes.  The following sections highlight the information deemed instrumental to 
answering the problem and approximations of key aspects.  
3.4.1 Simulation Component 
The simulation modeling effort begins with the accumulation of information from 
the environment that is pertinent to the model being built.  Although exact replication of 
the real world system can lend much value and credibility to the study of the simulation 
and in some cases could be vital, i.e. training systems, one must make a judgment about 
whether such a level of abstraction is necessary for addressing the specific problem being 
studied.   
In this section, we describe the simulation model structure used in this study and 
explain the logic and the model settings.  The model is a composite of two models.  One 
model investigates the specific at-sea interdiction mission while the other utilizes USCG 
resources based on a 2004 asset percent usage report provided by the USCG [41].  The 
purpose of the latter model is to mimic the expected resource utilization based on mission 
area of the assets being studied.  Later in this work, we describe this latter model as the 
“competing missions model” or the “operational usage model” depending on the context 
of the discussion.   
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3.4.1.1 Simulation Software 
The simulation component of this model was created using Arena version 10.0, a 
product of Rockwell Software that offers a user-friendly language for high-level 
graphical simulation.  It provides easy-to-use tools for studying a system or multiple 
configurations of a system, real or not, and allows the user to implement different rule 
sets, restrictions, or enhancements to determine impacts to the system without affecting 
actual operations.  Arena version 10.0 comes with input and output analysis software for 
thorough modeling of the system under study.  Although Arena provides an optimizer 
along with the software package, we built our own interface to Arena to perform this 
function to demonstrate the effectiveness of a Matlab-Arena interface.  For more 
information about Arena, please visit http://www.arenasimulation.com/. 
3.4.1.2 Interdiction Model 
The interdiction model represents the three processes of interdiction (interception, 
control and boarding, and inspection) as performed by assets in the deepwater 
environment.  There are two components to the interdiction model, the creation of threat 
and the creation of the assets that will respond to the interdiction.  Recall, the deepwater 
environment stretches from 50 to 200 nautical miles off the coast of the United States.  
The following section elaborates on this environment.  
3.4.1.2.3 Area of Study 
To more effectively manage resources to handle the multitude of missions at 
hand, the USCG has divided the United States into fourteen districts shown in Figure 3-3.  
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Figure 3-3:  United States Coast Guard Districts 
 
This study focuses on a portion of the 7th district stretching from Charleston, 
South Carolina, around the Florida peninsula, to the beginning of the Florida pan handle.  
This district was chosen for the maturity of its deepwater upgrades and the variety of 
assets located there.  The portions of the 7th district not modeled are those operations that 
occur beyond the 50 to 200 nautical mile area around the coast of Florida.  Table 3-1 
provides a listing of the 7th district assets modeled in this effort with search areas 
identified in Figure 3-4.   
Table 3-1:  Modeled Deepwater Assets from the 7th District 
ASSET LOCATION 
HH60 St. Petersburg, FL 
HH65 Location 1 Cape Canaveral, FL 
HH65 Location 2 Jacksonville, FL 
HH65 Location 3 Savannah, GA 
WPB Location 1 Charleston, SC 
WPB Location 2 Key West, FL 
WPB Location 3 Miami, FL 
WPB Location 4 St. Petersburg, FL 
270 ft. WMEC Location 1 Search Area 1 
270 ft. WMEC Location 2 Search Area 1 
378 ft. WHEC Location 1 Search Area 1 
378 ft. WHEC Location 2 Search Area 1 
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Figure 3-4:  Area of Study 
 
3.4.1.2.3 Integrated Deepwater System  
The system under study is a group of missions performed by the Integrated 
Deepwater System (IDS), an acquisition program funded to extend the life of the aging 
USCG fleet and enhance capability to support a larger and more demanding set of 
missions.   
Deepwater Missions 
Deepwater missions are generally missions that occur between 50 and 200 
nautical miles from US shores and they differ from the usual coastal zone missions by 
requiring extended on-scene presence, long transit distances to reach operating areas, 
forward deployment of forces, or a combination of these factors [41].  Table 3-2 presents 
the USCG Deepwater missions by strategic goal. 
Perpetuated by the events of 9/11, missions related to homeland defense have 
gained top priority next to search and rescue (SAR) requirements.  These missions are 
maritime homeland security (MHLS) under maritime security, maritime intercept 
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operations (MIO), port operations, security, and defense (POSD), and coastal sea control 
operations (CSCO) under national defense.  Each of these missions has an impact on the 
percentage of time required to intercept, board and control, and inspect a targeted threat. 
Table 3-2:  USCG Deepwater Missions Organized by Strategic Goal 
United States Coast Guard Deepwater Missions 
Maritime Safety 
search and rescue (SAR) 
International Ice Patrol (IIP) 
Maritime Security 
Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations (AMIO) 
Drug Interdiction (DRUG) 
Living Marine Resource Enforcement (LMR) [Foreign  Fishing Vessel (FFV) 
Incursions] 
General Law Enforcement (GLE) 
Maritime Homeland Security (MHLS) 
Protection of Natural Resources 
Maritime Pollution Enforcement and Response (MARPOL) 
Foreign Vessel Inspection (FVI) 
Lightering Zone Enforcement (LZE) 
LMR [Domestic/International] 
National Defense 
Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) [formerly known as Peacetime Military 
Engagement (PME)] 
General Defense Operations (GDO) 
Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) 
Military Environmental Response Operations (MERO), formerly Environmental 
Defense Operations (EDO) 
Port Operations, Security, and Defense (POSD) 
Coastal Sea Control Operations (CSCO) 
 
Deepwater Assets 
Five types of USCG deepwater assets are modeled in the three processes under 
investigation.  The 378 ft secretary class high endurance cutter (WHEC) has a maximum 
speed 29 kts and a long term endurance of 14,000 NM at 11 kts for 60 days.  It can 
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evacuate up to 500 persons.  As a method of conveyance to the targeted vessel, it would 
require vertical insertion of the inspection team via HH60. 
The 270 ft famous class medium endurance cutter (WMEC) has a maximum 
speed of 19.5 kts or long term endurance of 9,900 NM at 12 kts for 45 days.  The WMEC 
can support HH65 and HH60 operations and up to 450 evacuees.   
The 110 ft patrol boat (WPB) has three variations (A, B, and C). Variation A has 
a maximum speed of 29.5 kts with maximum range of 3,300 NM at 13 kts.  Variation B 
has a maximum speed of 29.5 kts with maximum range of 2,960 NM at 13 kts.  Variation 
C has a maximum speed of 26 kts with a maximum range of 3,500 NM at 10 kts.  Each 
variation has a patrol duration of 5 days and can support 150 evacuees.  This asset has 
been modeled with the average speed of the three variations. 
HH60J rotary-wing helicopter holds four crew and six survivors.  It has an action 
radius of 292 NM and limited night and low-visibility search capability.  The HH65A/B 
rotary wing helicopter holds four crew and three survivors. It has an action radius of 109 
NM.  
Inspection Team 
The inspection team consists of six to ten members equipped to detect weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) such as nuclear weapons.  Biological and chemical-based 
weapons may not be as easy to detect through current technological means, but a visual 
inspection of potential threats would most likely alert the team to the need for a more 
thorough inspection at a remote location near the port where experts can further review 
the threat potential.  These teams prepare for the mission at one of two staging areas, 
Elizabeth City, N.C. or Clearwater, FL. 
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3.4.1.2.3 Targeted Vessel 
A sea-borne threat can be a small speed boat or a Post Panamax cargo ship.  It can 
be a stowaway person, group, crew, or even the vessel itself.  While a threat could be 
considered a ship that presents an ecological hazard due to poor implementation of safety 
standards, here a threat will be limited to something with the intent to do harm.  A study 
of all traffic into US ports regardless of size and type of conveyance is necessary to 
evaluate the potential terrorist and environmental risk. However, this study will only 
focus on the interdiction of potential terrorist threats above 500 tons.  
Vessel Size 
This study is mainly concerned with shipping vessels ranging in size from 500 to 
8,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs).  Figure 3-5 shows vessel sizes in their 
respective generation and approximate age.  The first and second generation of cargo ship 
can carry approximately 500 to 800 and 1,000 to 2,500 TEUs , respectively.  The third 
and fourth generation can carry 3,000 to 5,000 TEUs.  The fifth generation (Post 
Panamax) can carry 5,000 to 8,000 TEUs.   
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Figure 3-5:  Vessel Sizes 
 
A constructed scale for vessel size is presented in Table 3-3 to suggest a scale of 
weighting for ship size as it affects the ability to perform the three processes of 
interdiction.   
Table 3-3:  Constructed Scale for Vessel Size 
Vessel Size Ranking % in Operation Cumulative %
Generation 1 1 10 10
Generation 2 2 10 20
Generation 3 3 50 70
Generation 4 4 20 90
Generation 5 5 10 100  
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The percentage of vessels in operation based on size has been arbitrarily chosen to 
be 10 percent from generation 1, 2, and 5, 20 percent from generation 4, and 50 percent 
in the generation 3 category.  This decision was made based on an assumption that the 
medium size vessel can traverse major canal systems while carrying a profitable cargo 
load. 
Types of Ships 
There are seven types of ships addressed in this study: tankers, container ships, 
dry bulk, ro-ro (roll on, roll off of vehicles or equipment), gas carriers (liquid natural 
gas), combination ships (part container, part bulk, etc.), and general cargo.  An 
assumption is made that the most difficult vessel to control and inspect is the 
containership due to the large number of hiding spaces and numerous containers that are 
hard to screen and may be hard to reach while at sea.  The second hardest to control and 
inspect is assumed to be a combination ship for the same reasons.  The third most 
difficult to inspect is the ro-ro type due to the large number of vehicles that would need to 
evaluated for explosive devices.   
The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh are tanker, gas, dry bulk, and general.  The 
tanker as a mode of transport for crude oil and oil products has large areas that are not 
hospitable to living organisms making search areas smaller.  However, this by no means 
negates the importance of understanding the threat a tanker poses as a terrorist weapon 
which is left for future study.  Gas tankers such as liquid natural gas present a similar 
argument.  General cargo and bulk are also assumed to be easier to control and inspect 
because of space limitations on the ship.  Although it is important to note that bulk 
carriers can carry materials such as fertilizer which increase the potential to be used as a 
 35
bomb under the right conditions.  This does not elevate the ease of control and inspection, 
but should be considered during evaluation of threat potential.  Table 3-4 summarizes the 
seven vessel types discussed here and offers a weight scale based on the potential of each 
type of ship to be used in terrorist activity.  The table also provides the cumulative 
percentage of foreign-flagged vessels by ship type. 
Table 3-4:  Ship Type Weighting with Corresponding Percentage of  
Foreign-Flagged Vessels 
General 1 3,840 7
Dry Bulk 2 11,275 28
Gas 3 969 30
Tanker 4 16,442 61
Ro-Ro 5 4,425 69
Combo 6 414 70
Container 7 15,937 100
Total 53,302 100
Ship Type Cumulative %   Weighting    
          # of Foreign-
Flagged Vessels
 
 
Foreign-flagged vessels are highlighted in this study because, being registered in 
countries other than the US, they do not receive the same scrutiny as US-registered 
vessels.  According to the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, the 
percentage of vessel calls to US ports for the seven types of ships are presented in Table 
3-5 below. 
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Table 3-5:  Percentage of Vessel Calls to US Ports in 2005 
Percent Vessel Calls to US Ports for 2005 
  
Number of All 
Vessels % 
Number of 
Foreign-Flagged 
Vessels % 
Tanker 20,118 32.95 16,442 30.85
Container 18,542 30.37 15,937 29.90
Dry Bulk 11,406 18.68 11,275 21.15
Ro-Ro 5,663 9.28 4,425 8.30 
Gas 969 1.59 969 1.82 
Combo 414 0.68 414 0.78 
General 3,935 6.45 3,840 7.20 
Total 61,047 100 53,302 100 
 
Ship Crew Size and Intent 
In this study, crew size is treated as a constant value of 15 people based on 
information provided through Maerskline, a large Danish shipping company.  Intent is 
something that can easily be masked, but in this study we treat the intent of the vessel 
operator and crew as observably compliant or non-compliant to orders from USCG 
authorities.  It is treated as a discrete distribution with a 90 percent probability of non 
hostile interaction and a 10 percent probability of hostile interaction.  The ability to 
determine intent could be developed through the study of multiple measures, i.e. vessel, 
cargo, and crew profiling, and deserves more attention than it will receive here due to 
limitations on available data. 
Threat Specificity 
Threat specificity is a determination made from the intelligence received on the 
targeted vessel, its crew, and/or its cargo.  This variable is treated discretely with a 95 
percent probability that the intelligence has identified a specific threat and a 5 percent 
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probability that the threat is non-specific.  A specific threat is considered a certain person, 
vessel, or cargo that has been flagged as suspicious.  A non-specific threat is one where 
the vessel may be known, but location of the threat on the ship or the true relation of the 
suspected person to terrorist ties is not fully understood.  
3.4.1.3 Simulation Model 
The simulation model is composed of the three process of interdiction: interception, 
boarding and control, and inspection.  Figure 3-6 shows the USCG interdiction model 
developed for this study.  In Figure 3-7, we present the submodel, “Team Transport” 
which shows the logic that composes the possible mechanisms of travel to the target.  
Recall that the inspection team can be transported to the targeted vessel through one of 
many paths described in Section 3.3.  Although we lay out the groundwork for a more in 
depth study of how the characteristics of the threat may affect the process times studied 
in this thesis, without data to formulate these relationships, we have chosen to take a 
more conservative approach to modeling these effects. 
Interception Process 
The simulation begins with the simultaneous creation of the targeted vessel and 
the inspection team at a simulation time of zero.  Targeted vessel creation has been set at 
a constant rate of one entity per 360 hours (or one month) for a maximum of 12 entities 
per replication.  Team creation is limited to one team only, but is duplicated through the 
use of a separate module. 
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Figure 3-6:  USCG Interdiction Model 
The team is transported to a staging area where they prepare to embark on the 
interdiction mission. They can stage from one of two locations, Elizabeth City, NC, or 
Clearwater, FL.  Depending on where they stage from, a delay will be incurred.  Staging 
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from Elizabeth City, NC is modeled as a triangular distribution with a minimum time of 
0.33 hours, a maximum time of 0.5 hours and a mode of 0.42 hours.  Transport from 
Clearwater, FL is modeled as a constant of 0.083 hours.  Due to the classification of the 
real values, these parameters represent a ballpark estimate.   
The “Team Transport” submodel captures the logic associated with the interception 
process.   In Figure 3-7, the first decision to be made is whether the sea conditions permit 
operations.  The attribute “Sea Condition” is modeled as a discrete random integer 
between 1 and 5.  Sea Conditions of 4 or greater restrict all operations.  Following the 
Sea Condition block are blocks that convert inputs from the Matlab code such as assets 
involved in the engagement and their locations to a format understood by Arena.  Where 
an alphanumeric string is used, it indicates the method(s) of conveyance by the inspection 
team.  For instance, “HH602702” indicates that the team will be transported by HH60 
helicopter to a 270 ft medium endurance cutter located at Location 2.  seize blocks are 
used to seize either transport assets or assets performing specific processes such as 
inspection or boarding and control.  This provides an added measure for tabulating the 
time required to perform a specific task.  Expression elements and process blocks are 
used to calculate and report the travel time.   
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Figure 3-7:  Team Transport Submodel 
 
Control and Boarding Process 
Once the team reaches the target (indicated with a batch module), the next process 
of controlling and boarding begins.  This process is not an inspection team function, but 
necessary for the eventual inspection of the vessel.  As discussed earlier, the control and 
boarding process is dependent on the compliance of the vessel crew with USCG 
authority.  The time required to board and control a compliant crew has been modeled as 
Uniform with a range of 0.3 to 1 hours; for a non-compliant crew, it is modeled as 
Uniform with a range of 0.5 to 2 hours.  Once control has been attained and access 
granted, the ship is searched for potential threats and the intent to harm.  Included in this 
time is the checking of crew manifests and identification as well as documentation of the 
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vessel for safety and security concerns.  This time is modeled as Uniform between 1 and 
2 hours.   
Inspection Process 
Upon determination that the vessel is secure, the team begins the inspection 
process.  Vessels, crew, and cargoes are targeted based on intelligence sources and can be 
specific in nature, i.e. container “x” on ship “y”, or nonspecific, i.e. a container coming 
from Hong Kong.  The specificity of the intelligence and the size of the inspection team, 
play a major role in how long the inspection process will take.  Due to the lack of data to 
properly model the parameters affecting the time required to inspect a targeted vessel, 
specific and non-specific threats have been modeled as: 
Non-Specific:  UNIF(6,12)*2 
Specific: UNIF(6,12)  
Based on historical data, the measured time to inspect a vessel targeted by specific 
intelligence is between six and twelve hours.  Once the inspection process is complete, 
the times are tallied and recorded and Arena saves the total time of the three processes 
which can then be retrieved by Matlab. 
Asset Utilization Model  
 
The operational usage model, also termed the competing mission model is found in 
Figure 3-8.  This model has been embedded with the USCG interdiction model to add the 
realism of day to day operations and their impact of resource availability to perform the 
at-sea interdiction process.  This model consists of the four Deepwater Strategic Goals 
(maritime safety, maritime security, protection of natural resources, and national defense) 
detailed in Table 3-2 earlier in this chapter.   
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Figure 3-8:  Operational Usage Model 
 
Each goal is broken down into mission areas which are then broken down into the 
Deepwater assets performing those mission areas based on asset utilization rates found in 
Table 3-6.  These rates are captured as percent utilization per day per mission averaged 
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over a year and modeled as an N-way percent chance using Decide Modules.  Figure 3-9:  
SAR Submodel is a snapshot of the search and rescue (SAR) submodel.  It provides a 
look into Deepwater asset usage for that particular mission.  Snapshot of each submodel 
are provided in Appendix C.  The output of the model is the utilization of assets similar to 
what would be expected in the true operational environment.   
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5. 64147
41. 07134
49. 67840
Else
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SAR_HH60
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     0
     0
     0
     0
     0
0       
Figure 3-9:  SAR Submodel 
 
As both models run, they compete for resources, thereby allowing for assessment 
of the operational impact to current mission operations if at-sea inspections were to be 
added to the list of current USCG responsibilities.   
Asset Utilization Rates 
The following tables provide the percent usage per day per mission of the assets 
studied in this thesis.  The percentages presented in the table, when implemented 
correctly in the model, will provide a realistic representation of the utilization rates of 
these assets in the operational environment. 
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Table 3-6:  Deepwater Asset Percent Usage/Day/Mission Averaged over 2004 
Deepwater 
Asset SAR AMIO DRUG PWCS GLE
378' WHEC 0.0000338 0.0004071 0.0021892 0.0000029 0.0000175
270' WMEC 0.0000397 0.0005979 0.0016213 0.0000824 0.0000561
110' WPB 0.0001149 0.0009179 0.001244 0.0000077 0.0000975
HH60 0.0008365 0.0003136 0.0014506 0.0000887 0.0000035
HH65 0.0010118 0.0004757 0.0005754 0.0002877 0.0000132
Deepwater 
Asset LMR DEF SUP FVI LZE MARPOL
378' WHEC 0.0000017 0.0000863 0.0000012 0.0000000 0.0000000
270' WMEC 0.0002376 0.0001025 0.0000000 0.0000009 0.0000014
110' WPB 0.0002555 0.0000950 0.0000018 0.0000049 0.0000004
HH60 0.0000207 0.0000089 0.0000089 0.0000000 0.0000089
HH65 0.0001127 0.0000114 0.0000497 0.0000000 0.0002020   
3.4.2   Optimization Component 
In this section, we describe the optimization approach for this research.  We 
provide a description of how the heuristic works and the framing of the problem for 
implementation of this heuristic.   
3.4.2.1 Simulation Optimization Interface 
The simulation optimization component consists of a tabu search heuristic written 
in Matlab v. 7.1 language, which feeds the simulation model the asset parameters, asset 
type and location, and controls the operation of the simulation model.  The simulation 
model applies the asset parameters to the simulation and returns an average time 
associated with these parameters back to the Matlab heuristic.  A depiction of the 
interface between Matlab and Arena is presented in Figure 3-10.   
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Figure 3-10:  Coordination between Simulation and Matlab Heuristic 
 
In this study, we have identified two types of conveyances that can be taken 
directly by the team either directly to the targeted vessel or to another USCG asset for 
interception of the targeted vessel—either the HH60 helicopter or the 110 ft. WPB patrol 
boat.   
The code selects an asset set for evaluation by the simulation.  The simulation 
returns a time which is retrieved by the code and compared to previous solutions.  The 
tabu list within the code has a tenure of three, i.e. it keeps the last three visited solutions.  
If a solution set is repeated in the last three moves, it will still be processed by the 
simulation, but will not become tabu unless the aspiration criteria is met.  The aspiration 
criteria allows a tabu move to be accepted if the time solution from the simulation 
improves the solution for that asset set.  The stopping criteria is set to 25 iterations.  The 
pseudo-code is provided in Figure 3-11.  The tabu search code can be found in Appendix 
C.  The next section provides an example of this simulation optimization technique.   
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 Algorithm Tabu Search 
 
Initialization  
1. Initialize tabu list and aspiration level;  
 Search Diversification 
2. For one iteration Do 
3. Randomly generate one neighborhood solution of interdicting assets;  
 Neighborhood Search 
4.   For one iteration Do 
5.  Present solution to simulation model for processing; 
6.  Receive initial objective function, Time, from model; 
7.  Set Time as current solution; 
8.  Replace one asset location for another in same neighborhood; 
9.  Return solution to model for processing; 
10.  Update neighborhood with new solution; 
11.  If move from current solution to new solution is not tabu and an improved 
  solution 
12.  Then 
13.   Accept move and update best solution; 
14.   Update tabu list and aspiration criteria; 
15.   Increment iteration number; 
16.  Else if new solution is in tabu list 
17.   If new Time is less than best time Then  
18.    Accept move and update best solution; 
19.    Update tabu list and aspiration criteria; 
20.    Increment iteration number; 
21.   EndIf 
22.  EndIf 
23.  Increment iteration number 
24.  Stop when difference in new best solution is less than 0.25 hours  
25.   End 
 
Figure 3-11:  Pseudo-Code for USCG Interdiction Problem 
 
3.5. An Example 
In this section, we present the first iteration as an example of the simulation 
optimization approach.  The performance measure of interest is the total time in system.  
This measure includes the time required for the inspection team to reach transport, the 
time required for the transport to reach the target of interest (TOI), the time required to 
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achieve control of the vessel and crew, and finally the time required to perform the 
inspection.  There are four possible locations from which the WPB can begin a mission.  
The HH60 starts from only one location.  The 270 ft and 378 ft cutters are out patrolling 
and have been assigned random locations within a 400 x 800 nautical mile area; however, 
these locations are fixed for this example.  Each asset and its location involved in the 
mission are designated by its name, the number of its location, and by any other asset 
assisting in the interdiction. For instance, WPB12702 indicates that a patrol boat from 
location one is transporting the inspection team to a 270 ft cutter at location two. 
          To begin the solution procedure, the tabu search (TS) algorithm is initiated to 
produce a random starting asset set.  The set is then updated by the code so that it 
conforms to constraints on asset usage, i.e. based on the feasible paths presented in 
Figure 1. The code returns one feasible set of assets per iteration as a 1 x 28 row vector of 
binary numbers indicating the interdiction process.  Figure 3 is an expanded diagram of 
Figure 1 and enumerates the possible paths.  The feasible set is sent to the simulation 
model, which in turn outputs an average for total time in system.  This solution is 
returned back to the code and compared with the best solution thus far.  If it is an 
improved solution and its corresponding asset set is not located in the tabu list, it is then 
added to the list.  If it is contained in the tabu list but is found to be a better solution than 
the current best, the aspiration criteria have been met and it becomes the new best 
solution.  The tabu list is then updated.  The procedure continues by swapping assets 
within a neighborhood until no further improvement of the solution is possible.   
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C270 – Location 2
WPB – Location 4
WPB – Location 3
WPB – Location 2
Inspection Team
HH-60
WPB – Location 1
C270 – Location 1
C378 – Location 2
C378 – Location 1
Target of Interest  
 
Figure 3-12:  Network Diagram of Nodes in USCG Resource Allocation Problem 
 
 
We have set a limit of five iterations as terminating criteria for a local 
neighborhood search not achieving improvement greater than 0.25 hours of the current 
best solution.  The optimization is complete when the stopping criterion is met.  The asset 
sets resulting from the first three iterations are presented in below. 
 
Set # Assets in Set Total Time in System
WPB from Location 2
270' Cutter from Location 1
WPB from Location 3
270' Cutter from Location 1
WPB from Location 3
--
Asset Set # 1 
Asset Set # 2
Asset Set # 3
27.19 hrs
15.97 hrs
15.85 hrs
 
Figure 3-13: Simulation Optimization Example of First Three Iterations of Search 
 
From the table above, Asset Set # 3 provides the minimum total time in system 
thus far.  This time will be the best current solution to which future solution(s) are 
compared.   
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3.6. Verification and Validation 
In this section, we describe the verification and validation for this model.  The 
reader should note that because the model was developed as a proof of concept for the 
interdiction process, the verification and validation of the system was performed with 
only subject matter expert guidance.  
3.6.1 Verification of Model Logic 
The system modeled in this research is highly conceptual in nature.  Although at-
sea inspections have taken place in the past, important aspects for modeling the system 
have not been considered until now.  Collection of data to support the study of them is 
lacking.  Furthermore, the specific data relating to at-sea boarding, such as the time 
required for a team of any given size to inspect a vessel of any given size, remains 
confidential under the current security posture of the United States.   
The model logic presented in this thesis was reviewed for adequate translation 
from USCG CONOPS to simulation in the computerized environment.  Outputs were 
reviewed for similarity to real interdiction missions. 
3.6.2 Model Validation 
Validation of the simulation model involves taking steps to ensure the model 
accurately represents the system or environment it is intended to represent.  Model 
validation was performed on numerous occasions with a USCG subject matter expert 
(SME).  Validation included review of process flow, arrival times of entities, process 
times for performing boarding and control and inspection of the vessel, the percentage of 
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specific versus nonspecific intelligence targeting, the percentage of compliant versus 
noncompliant crews,  crew size, and team size determinations, to evaluate their 
legitimacy.  Simulation results were consistent with anticipated system behavior.  The 
simulation model has face validity. 
3.7. Conclusion 
In chapter three, we described the study environment from the area of study to the 
two components of the model, the simulation component and the optimization 
component.  We explained how these two components function in order to move toward 
a near optimal solution.  Further, we provided an example of how the simulation 
optimization is performed.  Lastly, we discussed the verification and validation of the 
model.  In the next chapter, we discuss the results of this study and provide an analysis 
for the reader..
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4. Results and Analysis 
4.1. Overview 
In Chapter three, we presented the decomposition of the USCG resource 
allocation problem.  We emphasized important structural considerations of the problem, 
i.e. attributes such as team size, sea condition, competing mission requirements, etc., and 
developed a discrete-event simulation model respective of these considerations.  Further, 
we verified the model logic, validated its outputs, and then provided an optimization 
procedure using a tabu search algorithm to select feasible USCG asset strings.   
In this chapter, we examine the results from the simulation optimization with a look 
at the measure of performance, total time in system,  as well as resource utilization and 
potential strategies for implementing an at-sea interdiction process.  Data is not readily 
available for a study of this kind, therefore any analysis of the quality of the results 
presented in this chapter have been performed, but should be considered suspect without 
validation using real system data or subject matter expertise.   
4.2. Experimental Setup 
Typically, in steady-state simulations, a check of initialization bias is performed to 
identify bias caused by unrealistic initial conditions.  Figure 4-1 is a plot of the simulation 
average outputs for ten replication lengths: 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, and 5 years.  
Each was run for a total of 20 replications and times averaged.  The graph suggests 
initialization bias is present up to 1.5 years.  Subsequently, all experiments included a 
warm up of 1.5 years with a total run time of ten years. 
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Figure 4-1:  Initialization Bias 
 
The replication number, R, was calculated based on 43 runs of 20 replications 
each for three half-length values (indicated as “H” below),  0.25, 0.5, and 1.0 hours, with 
a t0.025,19  and a t0.05,19.  The mean was calculated to be 18.2168 with a standard deviation 
of 1.9081.  A half-length of one hour with a confidence interval of 90 percent was 
selected for subsequent experiments.   
Replication # t(0.025,19) t(0.05,19)
R (H = 0.25 hr) 253.4728032 173.2823
R (H = 0.5 hr) 63.36820081 43.32058
R (H = 1.0 hr) 15.8420502 10.83015  
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4.3. Experimentation Results 
In this section, we present the results of the study.  We first examine the 
performance measure, total time in system, which is composed of process times for the 
three processes: intercept time, boarding and control time, and inspect time.  These 
results are applied along with results from the asset utilization study in the evaluation of 
three strategies for the USCG resource allocation problem.   
4.3.1 Performance Measure 
The following section addresses the performance measure of interest—the total 
time in system.  This measure includes the time required for the inspection team to reach 
transport, the time to reach the target of interest (TOI), the time required to achieve 
control of the vessel and crew, and finally the time required to perform the inspection.   
The tabu search code was run for 25 iterations of 20 replications each.  Each 
replication was set to a length of ten years at 24 hours a day with a warm up period of 1.5 
years for a replication length of ten years.  Target creation was set to one per month and 
competing missions were set to one mission created per week per strategic goal.  The 
system and statistics were initialized before each replication to ensure independence 
between replications.   
The best solution for the total time in system was found to be 17.3143 hours.  The 
corresponding USCG asset set is the HH60 with the 270 ft. medium endurance cutter 
from search area 1.  The mean value for the total time in system is presented in Table 4-1.  
For a 95 percent confidence interval, the bounds on this time are [19.15,19.88].  The 95 
percent prediction interval is [17.44, 21.60].   
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Table 4-1:  Performance Measure Statistics 
Mean 19.51822443 
Standard Deviation 0.987813738 
Upper Confidence Interval 19.88708013 
Lower Confidence Interval 19.14936872 
Upper Prediction Interval 21.59644932 
Lower Prediction Interval 17.43999954 
 
The best minimum time achieved was 17.3134; however, using a 95 percent 
confidence interval on the overall mean time indicates that the time will fall in the 
interval of [19.15, 19.88] for the values collected.  The prediction interval on the total 
time in system suggests that there is a small amount of risk inherent in the expected value 
of the interdiction process.  An important point to stress is that, because this system has 
not yet been implemented, these results can not be validated with any degree of certainty.  
They are provided only to demonstrate the utility of the model.  In the next section, we 
analyze the utilization rates for the assets investigated in this research under typical 
mission needs and then use them to build potential USCG strategies for Deepwater 
resource allocations.  
4.3.2 Asset Utilization Rates  
In this section, we consider the system under the stress of different operations 
tempo (ops tempo).  The feasibility of implementing the interdiction CONOPS and at 
what level depends on resource availability as other operations create demands on those 
resources.  Three ops tempos were examined—low, medium, and high.  Of the four 
mission areas, Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, Protection of Natural Resources, and 
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National Defense, a low ops tempo is considered to be one with roughly one mission 
created per week per mission area; a medium ops tempo is considered to be one with 
about three missions are created per week per mission area; a high ops tempo is 
considered in this study as the creation of one mission per day per mission area.  While 
SAR and National Defense missions can last multiple days, the other missions were 
modeled at Uniform between four and eight hours.  The simulation optimization was run 
for 25 iterations with 20 replications per run each a length of ten years at the following 
settings: 
Table 4-2:  Nine Scenarios for Asset Utilization Study 
Low Threat - Low Ops Tempo Low Threat - Med Ops Tempo Low Threat - High Ops Tempo
Med Threat - Low Ops Tempo Med Threat - Med Ops Tempo Med Threat - High Ops Tempo
High Threat - Low Ops Tempo High Threat - Med Ops Tempo High Threat - High Ops Tempo  
 
Table 4-3, Table 4-4,  and Table 4-5 provide the results of the different resource 
utilization scenarios.  Table 4-3 shows resource utilization under low threat interdiction 
conditions with low, medium, and high ops tempos.  The average best time is 18.27 hours 
and the corresponding asset sets varied between sets with HH60, HH65, and 270 ft cutter 
and WPB only.  The reader might notice that the data appears to have inconsistencies 
from one ops tempo to the next.  This may be due to the random nature of the 
components within the simulation model, i.e. the competing missions that are generated.  
Either increasing the length or number of replications should take care of this, but will be 
left for future experimentation, with a higher fidelity model. 
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Table 4-3:  Resource Utilization under Low Threat Interdiction Operations 
Low Ops Tempo Medium Ops Tempo High Ops Tempo
HH60 0.1401 0.1015 0.2170
HH65 0.0038 0.0086 0.0256
WPB Patrol Boat 0.2008 0.3463 0.1836
270 ft Cutter 0.1326 0.0777 0.3636
378 ft Cutter 0.2155 0.2335 0.3164
Average Asset Utilization for Low Threat Interdiction Level
 
 
Table 4-4 shows the utilization rates under a medium threat interdiction level and 
low, medium, and high ops tempo.  The 270 ft cutter is the most utilized asset in this 
case; however, the asset set that dominated the interdiction process is the asset set with 
only the patrol boat.  The average time for interdiction for the three ops tempos at a 
medium level of interdiction is 19.46 hours.   
Table 4-4:  Resource Utilization under Medium Threat Interdiction Operations 
Low Ops Tempo Medium Ops Tempo High Ops Tempo
HH60 0.0044 0.2081 0.3014
HH65 0.0038 0.0085 0.0258
WPB Patrol Boat 0.0043 0.0064 0.0222
270 ft Cutter 0.0403 0.2610 0.3638
378 ft Cutter 0.0317 0.2446 0.3122
Average Asset Utilization for Medium Threat Interdiction Level
 
Table 4-5 shows the utilization rates for high threat interdiction operations.  378 ft 
cutter usage almost doubled at medium and high ops tempo levels from the previous case.  
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At a low ops tempo, it appears that performing one interdiction per day will result in 
almost a two fold usage of assets when compared to medium interdiction operations.  At 
medium and high ops tempo, we see that patrol boats and 378 ft. cutters, as in the 
previous results, are heavily used.  The average minimum time to perform the interdiction 
is 20.69 hours and from the simulation optimization data, we find that the patrol boat 
with/without 378 ft cutter support, provides the best solution.   
Table 4-5:  Resource Utilization under High Threat Interdiction Operations 
Low Ops Tempo Medium Ops Tempo High Ops Tempo
HH60 0.0044 0.0208 0.2982
HH65 0.0038 0.0085 0.0256
WPB Patrol Boat 0.4026 0.3831 0.4134
270 ft Cutter 0.4255 0.2628 0.3603
378 ft Cutter 0.4188 0.4344 0.6288
Average Asset Utilization for High Threat Interdiction Level
 
 
In the next section, we evaluate the potential strategies for resource allocation of 
USCG resources. 
4.4. Evaluation of Strategies for USCG Resource Allocation 
In the previous section we noted that the 378 ft cutter and WPB patrol boat are 
used heavily in most of the scenarios investigated.  This indicates a possible bottleneck in 
mission completion due to lack of capability that these crucial assets provide.  Another 
important observation is that ops tempo appears to be independent of interdiction 
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operations until ops tempo and the level of interdiction operations increases to a high 
level.  Further investigation is required to gain insight into these results, but making the 
assumption that the model contains the right level abstracted information to assess this 
resource allocation problem, we have three recommended strategies for USCG resource 
allocation of Deepwater assets.   
4.4.1 Strategy 1: Increase Fleet and/or Locations of WPB patrol boats 
Recall the asset set that dominated the best solutions in the interdiction process was 
the set with the WPB patrol boat.  This result could possibly be attributable to the variety 
of locations of the patrol boat and the fact that transport of the inspection team can be 
direct to the target of interest or via cutter support.  Patrol boats are in large supply in the 
USCG and although, other concerns such as maintenance requirements were not 
investigated in this study, it appears that in the Deepwater environment (50 to 200 
nautical miles from US coasts) patrol boats are fundamental to maintaining port security.  
While the idea of the importance of patrol boat allocation is supported by the fact that the 
current allocation of patrol boats is large compared to other surface assets, it can be 
argued that more locations and/or more of these assets may serve to enhance the overall 
level of interdiction operations.  A closer examination of this result with a higher fidelity 
model is required.   
4.4.2 Strategy 2:  Integrate Inspection Team with Deployed Cutters 
With a twist to strategy 1, strategy 2 suggests the integration of a fully functional 
inspection team deployed with each surface asset, to include WPB patrol boats.  Fully 
functional is defined here as a team capable of inspecting for nuclear, biological, and 
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chemical hazards.  This addition would give the patrol boat platform all necessary 
capability to perform the three processes of interception, control and boarding, and 
inspection, as well other missions currently on task.  This strategy could be implemented 
without a requirement to purchase more assets, but may present a need for better 
technological advancements of inspection equipment and/or more personnel to perform 
inspections.   
4.4.3 Strategy 3:  Develop Asset-Specific CONOPS 
A growing concept in the Department of Defense is the idea of capabilities-based 
acquisition.  The point is to determine the necessary capability and then build the system 
to meet it as opposed to past acquisition practices where the system was designed first 
and then the capability was implemented.  For example, suppose you had a requirement 
to destroy enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.  Capabilities based thinking 
transforms this requirement from a rigid concept of how to meet the requirement, i.e. 
bomb it, to something that can be achieved through a variety of alternatives.  The 
requirement then becomes: eliminate the effectiveness of enemy surface-to-air missile 
(SAM) sites.  This opens up the door to other ways of achieving this objective—through 
kinetic effects or perhaps electromagnetic effects to achieve the same goal: eliminate the 
effectiveness of the SAM site.   
Similarly, strategy 3 involves assessing the capabilities of under-utilized assets and 
deriving new ways of implementing their capabilities to support missions that are 
consuming the time of heavily used assets.  Recall that based on this model, the HH60 
and HH65 assets appear to be under utilized.  While this result requires more scrutiny, it 
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identifies the potential for using these assets in other mission areas in order to relieve the 
heavily used assets from the current resource strain.  This idea requires more 
consideration, but can offer insight into how to achieve flexibility in meeting mission 
needs. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we presented experimental results for our measure of 
performance, total time in system, and analyzed asset utilization rates for various 
scenarios.  We then applied these results to come up with three potential strategies for 
enhancing the USCG role in port security.  Specifically, we found that the WPB patrol 
boat is fundamental to meeting the interdiction mission in the Deepwater environment.  
We used this information to develop strategy 1, an increase in patrol boats or locations of 
patrol boats, to meet the needs of the interdiction mission.  We also suggested adding 
function to each surface asset to reduce the amount of time required to get the inspections 
underway and recommended changes to doctrine to handle a broader range of missions 
with the under-utilized assets.  In the next chapter, our results are summarized and future 
work is presented to enhance this model and address other military applications. 
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5. Conclusion and Future Work 
This study began with a desire to capture a perspective of port security and apply 
a simulation optimization methodology to solve it.  Collaboration with the United States 
Coast Guard shifted our view to the fertile research area of the at-sea interdiction process 
composed of the three processes: interception, control and boarding, and inspection of a 
targeted vessel.  We built a tabu search metaheuristic, established an automated interface 
between Matlab and Arena, and demonstrated the simulation optimization methodology 
can be applied to problem in maritime security.  From these developments, we were able 
to experiment on a system that doesn’t yet exist and provide feedback to the USCG on 
resource allocation strategies.   
5.1. Simulation Optimization 
In this study, we developed a simulation optimization approach for assessing the 
resource allocation of USCG Deepwater assets using a tabu search metaheuristic 
interfaced with a discrete-event simulation model.  We demonstrated this method on a 
USCG resource allocation problem.  The results of this demonstration are presented in 
the following section. 
5.2. Summary of Findings 
Specifically, we found that the best total time to perform the interdiction process 
we could achieve, with consideration to the adequacy of  the model, is 17.3143 hours.  
We found that the corresponding asset set for this time is the HH60, 270 ft cutter 
combination.   
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We looked at utilization rates of nine different scenarios involving low, medium, 
and high interdiction operation levels over low, medium, and high ops tempos and found 
that the asset sets that dominated each set of scenarios were those that contained the WPB 
patrol in the solution set.  This led us to the conclusion that WPB patrol boats are 
fundamental to the performance of interdiction operations in the Deepwater environment.  
We funneled these observations into three strategies for meeting the obligations of the 
interdiction CONOPS while maintaining the current mission workload. 
1. Increase the fleet and/or location of WPB patrol boats 
2. Integrate the inspection teams with surface assets 
3. Develop asset-specific concept of operations 
We believe that depending on the fluctuating resource constraints experienced by 
all branches of the Department of Defense, these strategies offer a range of alternatives 
and are implementable considering the nature of defense funding.  We do stress that more 
research using a higher fidelity model is warranted, but attainment of this model would 
be driven by the need for more data. 
5.3. Applicability 
The applicability of this model, first and foremost, is as a simulation optimization 
tool for linking Matlab to Arena.  This is extended to USCG resource allocations of 
Deepwater assets as a tactical measurement of impact to other mission areas as the 
number of interdiction operations is increased.  The model investigates resource 
bottlenecks and can be used to determine appropriate resource allocations for meeting all 
Deepwater missions.  Furthermore, the simulation optimization approach developed in 
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this study is demonstrated on the USCG 7th district assets, but is general enough to be 
applied to address a larger asset allocation problem.   
5.4. Recommendations for Future Research 
The focus on port security is only just beginning which makes this topic abundant in 
possible future research.  Furthermore, the study of military operations, such as the 
USCG interdiction CONOPS, has a profound relationship with the application of 
heuristics and most definitely with simulation.  These topics truly are endless in their 
possibilities, so only three avenues of future research are presented in the next section for 
thought.  
5.4.1 Model Enhancements 
The interdiction process addressed in this thesis has not been studied extensively; 
therefore very little data exists to model this process to a finer level of detail.  Data 
requirements, in order to achieve a greater fidelity, would include threat arrival rates, 
times associated with different aspects of the boarding and control process (i.e. checking 
for signs of immediate danger and identifying crew members, times associated with 
inspection of various types, sizes, and specificities of vessel threats.  Using response 
surface methodology coupled with the provision of data for the processes modeled in this 
thesis, one could build objective functions that accurately represent the significant input 
parameters that make up the travel time, boarding and control, and inspection processes.  
This would provide a better understanding of the relationship between, for instance, the 
size of a vessel and how long it would take to inspect.  This area could be further 
developed in the port-centric environment, where screening processes need to be 
 64
efficient.  Related to this suggestion is the application of decision analysis to more 
appropriately model the priorities of USCG missions.  This could be further expanded to 
look at risk postures at US ports.  One possible means to gathering this type of data is 
during training exercises.   
5.4.2 Agent-Based Simulation 
We live in a dynamic world.  One of the drawbacks of monte-carlo simulation is 
the inability to model those dynamics.  When studying a system that involves human 
decision making, it becomes more evident that simulation of such a system should be as 
flexible as the human thought that goes into the actual system.  An enhancement to 
studying port security would be to develop a model using agent-based simulation 
software.  While artificial intelligence is still a work in progress, there is something to be 
gained in modeling a system where actions of players in the system can be described by 
rules of engagement and can develop strategic thinking within the simulation.  This type 
of modeling may allow for identifying vulnerabilities in the system based on how the 
players react to different deterrence measures.  Specifically, modeling the intentions of a 
terrorist at a port through agent based simulation, might open up security officials to a 
different way of viewing security.   
5.4.3 Military Applications 
Another area of study to enhance USCG mission success is the optimization of 
USCG cutter search areas using updateable location and heading parameters.  Cutters 
move in a defined pattern to reduce the chance of missing a potential security threat.  A 
question to ask is:  “Is there a more optimal path that can assure the cutter has performed 
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a more complete search?”  Establishing probabilities associated with locating a target in a 
particular search area could be beneficial to reducing wasted search time in areas where 
targets may have a low probability of being located.  This problem may be easily handled 
as a stochastic traveling salesman problem (TSP).  
5.5. Summary 
In a post-9/11 reality, the US recognizes the need to identify any and all potential 
threats to national security and to implement measures to enhance that level of security 
where necessary.  In a study of vulnerabilities of the border and transportation system, the 
9/11 Commission report acknowledged the need of US ports for more security.  Further 
study of the problem revealed the it's immensity calls for an approach with multiple-
layers of security such that the breakdown of any one layer would not force the complete 
breach of US national security or collapse of the US economy.  We addressed the 
interdiction layer of this multiple layer approach in the hopes of applying the principles 
of operations research to evaluate a USCG concept of operations.  This work is part of a 
beginning in the application of simulation optimization in the port security environment. 
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Appendix A:  List of Acronyms 
AMIO Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations 
BTS Border and Transportation Security 
CBP Customs and Border Protection 
CSCO Coastal Sea Control Operations 
CSI Container Security Initiative 
C-TPAT Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DMOES Deepwater Maritime Operational Effectiveness Simulation
DRUG Drug Interdiction 
FMC Federal Maritime Commission 
FSMP Flow-Shop with Multiple Processors  
FVI Foreign Vessel Inspection 
GDO General Defense Operations 
GLE General Law Enforcement 
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
IDS Integrated Deepwater System 
IIP  International Ice Patrol 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
ISPS International Ship and Port Facility Security 
LMR Living Marine Resource Enforcement 
LZE Lightering Zone Enforcement 
MARPOL Maritime Pollution Enforcement and Response 
MERO Military Environmental Response Operations 
MHLS Maritime Homeland Security 
MIO Maritime Intercept Operations 
MSC Maritime Safety Committee 
NP Nondeterministic Polynomial 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSC Operation Safe Commerce 
PME Peacetime Military Engagement 
POSD Port Operations Security and Defense 
PWCS Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 
SAR Search and Rescue 
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea 
TEU Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit 
TOI Target of Interest 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
VAR Value at Risk 
WHEC High Endurance Cutter 
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270 ft Medium Endurance Cutter (WMEC)
378 ft High Endurance Cutter (WHEC)
Appendix B:  USCG Study Assets 
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HH-60 Jayhawk
HH-65 Dolphin 
110 ft WPB Patrol Boat 
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Appendix C:  Matlab Code 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%Tabu Search for USCG Asset Allocation Problem%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%by Kristen Cavallaro%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%           
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%VARIABLES:                                                     %
%B is a randomly selected string of assets sent to the simulation                       %
%Locx is the x-coordinates of assets in the B string                           %
%Locy is the y-coordinates of assets in the B string                           %
%Tabu tenure set to 3 asset sets                                %
%Tabu list is the last 3 asset sets processed                   %
%Stopping criteria set to 25 iterations                         %
%Time is the average time for the interdiction process from simu output            %
%To run simulation optimization from command window, use this command:    %
%TabuCavallaro('I:\My Documents\Cavallaro\SimOptCavallaroDist.doe')             %
%Replication number can be changed via the code at line 40      %
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function[Best,AllSoln] = TabuCavallaro(strfile)
clc;
B =[];
Bset = [];
Assets = [];
Assets2 = [];
Locationx = [];
Locationy = [];
Location2x = [];
Location2y = [];
Time = 0;
Locx = [];
Locy = [];
Best = [0,0,0]';
TimeSoln = inf(3,1);
AllSoln = [];
Tabu = [];
SortTime = [inf,inf,inf]';
%%%%%%%%%%%LOCATE ARENA SERVER%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
arna = actxserver('arena.application');
arnaModel = arna.Model;
mymodel = arnaModel.invoke('Open',strfile);
arnaModules = mymodel.Modules;
mymodel.numberofreplications = num2str(20);         %Select number of reps
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%MAIN LOOP%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
for w = 1:25                                                    %Stopping Criteria: 25 Iterations
o = rand(1);
t = o*2;
s = ceil(t);        
I = eye(8);
Loc1 = [140,497;211,651;136,720;145,772;rand*422,rand*158;...
rand*158+264,rand*592+197;rand*158+264,rand*592+197;rand*422,rand*158];
Loc2 = [211,789;211,158;264,197;140,497;rand*422,rand*158;...
rand*158+264,rand*592+197;rand*158+264,rand*592+197;rand*422,rand*158];
%%%%%%%%%%%%HH60 NEIGHBORHOOD CONSTRUCTION%%%%%%%%%%  
if s == 1                                                   
x = ceil(rand*4);
y = ceil(rand*2 + 6);
z = ceil(rand*2+4);
A = I(:,1);
u = rand;
v = rand;
if x == 1
if u > 0.5
B = A + I(:,y);
end
if v > 0.5
B = A + I(:,z);
end
end
if x == 2 | x == 3| x==4
B = A + I(:,x)+I(:,z);
end
Locx = B.*Loc1(:,1);
Locy = B.*Loc1(:,2);
end
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%%%%%%%%%%%WPB NEIGHBORHOOD CONSTRUCTION%%%%%%%%%
if s == 2                                             %WPB Neighborhood
u = rand;
x = ceil(rand*4);
y = ceil(rand*4+4);
if u > 0.5
B = I(:,x) + I(:,y);
else
B = I(:,x);
end
Locx = B.*Loc2(:,1);
Locy = B.*Loc2(:,2);
end
assetsets(B,Locx,Locy,arnaModules);
SortTimes = sort(TimeSoln,1);
Best = SortTimes(1:3);
Time = runarena(mymodel,arna);          %Retrieve Time value from Arena
mymodel.End;
TimeSoln = [TimeSoln;Time];               
Bset = [Bset;B'];
if w==1 | w==2 | w==3
Tabu = [Tabu;Bset(w,:)];                      %Tabu tenure set to 3
else
for m = 1:3
if B~=Bset(w-m)        %Checks new asset set against tabu list
B = Bset(w-m);      %If set has not been visited in last 3
end                     %moves, add to list
Tabu = [Tabu;Bset(w-m,:)]; 
end
end
disp(Tabu)
AllSoln = [AllSoln;w,s,Time,B'];
end
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FUNCTIONS
%%%%%%%%%%%%%SEND ASSET SETS TO ARENA%%%%%%%
function assetsets(B,Locx,Locy,arnaModules)
idx = arnaModules.Find(1,'object.10725');   %Asset set
Assets = arnaModules.Item(idx);
for p = 1:8
set(Assets,'Data',['Initial Value(',num2str(p),')'],B(p));
get(Assets,'Data',['Initial Value(',num2str(p),')']);
end
idx = arnaModules.Find(1,'object.10964');   %Locationx
Locationx = arnaModules.Item(idx);
for p = 1:8
set(Locationx,'Data',['Initial Value(',num2str(p),')'],Locx(p));
get(Locationx,'Data',['Initial Value(',num2str(p),')']);
end
idx = arnaModules.Find(1,'object.11024');   %Locationy
Locationy = arnaModules.Item(idx);
for p = 1:8
set(Locationy,'Data',['Initial Value(',num2str(p),')'],Locy(p));
get(Locationy,'Data',['Initial Value(',num2str(p),')']);
end
return
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%RUN MODEL GET TIME%%%%%%%%%%%
function [Time] = runarena(mymodel,arna)
mymodel.Go;
sout = arna.activemodel.siman;
total = sout.OutputStatisticsMaximum
for i = 1:total
strname = sout.ConstructString(12, i, 0);
if strncmp(strname,'TotalTimeAvg',12) == 1
Time = sout.OutputStatisticValue(i);
i = total + 1;
end
end
return
end
end
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Appendix D:  Simulation Model 
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Team Transit Submodel 
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Operational Usage Model 
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Operational Usage Model Decomposition 
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